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PROFESSOR ALAN R. BROMBERG
AND THE SCHOLARLY ROLE
OF THE TREATISE
Wendy Gerwick Couture*

ISTINGUISHED Professor Alan R. Bromberg's scholarship is
multi-faceted and extensive, but this essay focuses on the unique
scholarly role of his treatise on securities fraud.1 Professor
Bromberg first published the treatise as a single volume in 1967 under the
title Securities Law: Fraud-SECRule lOb-5. In 1979, Lewis D. Lowenfels joined Professor Bromberg as a co-author, and in 2012, Michael J.
Sullivan joined as a second co-author. By 2014, the treatise, re-titled
Bromberg and Lowenfels on Securities Fraud,had reached eight volumes
in length.
In the 48 years since Professor Bromberg published the first edition of
this treatise, it has been extraordinarily influential in the development of
securities fraud jurisprudence. For example, the Supreme Court has cited
the treatise in nine opinions, 2 and the treatise has been cited in at least
757 law review and journal articles. 3 This essay uncovers and revisits earlier versions of the treatise 4 to demonstrate its influence in the development of securities fraud jurisprudence and to identify the factors that led
to its importance, arguing that Professor Bromberg and his co-authors'
treatise shows the continuing importance of treatises within legal
scholarship.
* Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associate Professor at the University of Idaho College of Law, where she teaches securities regulation. She is a 2003 graduate of the SMU
Dedman School of Law.
1. Securities fraud is prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
lob-5 promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 114-13); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2015).
2. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 179 (2008); Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 601 (1995); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459
U.S. 375, 384 n.19 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 250 (1980); Santa Fe
Indus., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 23, 27, 38,
65 n.17 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729, 734, 735, 752
n.15 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972); SEC
v. Nat'l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 470 (1969).
3. On April 6, 2015, the author performed the following advanced search in
Westlaw's law reviews and journals database: Bromberg /10 (securities rule).
4. The author would like to thank Professor Michael Greenlee at the University of
Idaho College of Law for his help in locating and retrieving several out-of-date versions of
Professor Bromberg's treatise.
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THE ROLE OF TREATISES WITHIN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Treatises currently play a somewhat controversial role within legal
scholarship. Historically, the writing of treatises was closely tied with
American legal education. 5 More recently, however, numerous scholars
6
have documented the decline of treatise-writing by law professors, citing
7 and the waning prestige of treatises
the rise of the realist movement
among legal academics. 8 Critics of modem legal education often decry
this development, citing it as evidence of disconnect between the legal
academy and the legal profession. 9
Additionally, treatises often influence in the shadows. Although litigators and courts 10 rely on treatises when performing legal research and
analysis,11 they shy away from citing treatises in briefs or opinions be5. A. W. B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the
Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 670-71 (1981) ("From Story's time
forward, the production of treatises was associated with organized, systemic legal education ... [T]he writing of treatises became the appropriate activity for law professors.").
6. Id. at 633 ("[I]t is remarkable that in the United States the practice of writing
treatises has declined significantly.").
7. Id. at 678 ("A movement that minimizes the importance of legal doctrine is hardly
likely to generate enthusiasm for the work of analyzing doctrine and expounded it as the
principled science of the law.").
8. Erwin Chemerinsky, 2009 Survey of Books Related to the Law: Foreword: Why
Write?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 881, 886-87 (2009) ("If I were advising a young colleague who
wanted to advance within or move to an elite institution, I would frankly say that there are
many rewards to doing casebooks and treatises, but recognition within the academy of law
professors is not among them."); Michael J. Madison, Symposium: Open Access Publishing
and the Future of Legal Scholarship: The Idea of the Law Review: Scholarship, Prestige and
Open Access, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 901, 910 (2006) ("The problem is that the traditional form of book-based legal scholarship is the treatise and the treatise is the kind of
scholarship that doesn't count for tenure and promotion as much as it used to."); George
L. Priest, Social Science Theory and Legal Education: The Law School as University, 33 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 437, 437 (1983) ("The treatise is no longer even a credit to those competing
on the leading edge of legal thought."); Christopher D. Stone, Comment, From a Language
Perspective, 90 YALE L. J. 1149, 1150 (1981) ("Treatises, some of them splendid, are still
being written, but the prestige of the undertaking has tarnished.").
9. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and
the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 57 (1992) ("Finally - and this is my main point pure theory should not wholly displace the production of treatises or articles that, interalia,
focus on legal doctrine. Unfortunately, this displacement is now beginning to occur and
therewith a grave disjunction between legal scholarship and the legal profession. 'Practical'
scholarship constitutes a vital link from the law schools to our system of justice - to the
legislators, administrators, judges, and practitioners who need thorough, thoughtful, concrete legal advice.").
10. E.g., Michelle M. Harner & Jason A. Cantone, Is Legal Scholarship Out of Touch?
An Empirical Analysis of the Use of Scholarship in Business Law Cases, 19 U. MIAMI Bus.
L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) ("The survey data also show that, even if judges do not cite legal
scholarship, they or their law clerks may, nevertheless, use scholarship in researching issues
raised in their cases. This result captures a utility of legal scholarship not susceptible to
observation in the data pulled from the courts' dockets (whether in this or other
studies).").
11. DAVID F. HERR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 3:2 (2014 ed.)
("If the lawyer already has the big picture of the law governing the particular question but
desires more specific information or case citations to support what the lawyer already
knows to be the truth, multi-volume treatises with annual supplements usually are most
useful.").
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cause they do not constitute primary authority. 12 Likewise, transactional
attorneys consult treatises when negotiating deals and advising clients,
but their work product is not captured in databases.
Finally, treatises, unlike other forms of legal scholarship, are ephemeral. When treatises are updated, early insights on unanswered questions
are lost as pages are removed, discarded, and replaced with updated authority. Often the treatise's role in shaping that authority is lost in the
process.
Against this backdrop, this essay argues that Professor Bromberg and
his co-authors' treatise on securities fraud demonstrates the important
role that treatises can continue to play within legal scholarship. In particular, Professor Bromberg created his treatise when securities fraud jurisprudence was in a dynamic state; he promoted clarity by creating an
interpretive framework and providing guidance therein. The treatise was
thus poised to exert influence at pivotal moments in the development of
securities fraud doctrine and to serve as a springboard for other scholarly
contributions.
II.

RECOGNITION OF A DYNAMIC AREA OF LAW

The creation of an important new treatise often depends on the recognition of a dynamic, uncharted area of law. As Professor Richard A. Danner asks: "Do we need a new Blackstone? Do we need new writers of
grand treatises like Story and Williston?" 13 After other scholars have engaged in the rigorous and creative activity of providing interpretive
frameworks for an area of law, a new treatise is less likely to be groundbreaking and intellectually stimulating. 14 Professor A. W. B. Simpson
concludes: "It requires some dramatic change to give rise to a distin'15
guished new treatise.
Indeed, in 1967, Professor Bromberg, inspired by the filing of the SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur case, 16 recognized that securities fraud jurispru12. Simpson, supra note 5, at 667 (explaining that, under "the formal status of the
treatise in the English theory of precedent ... the opinion of a treatise writer generally is
not authoritative").
13. Richard A. Danner, 2013 Survey of Books Related to the Law: Foreword: Oh, The
Treatise!, 111 MICH. L. REV. 821, 834 (2013).
14. Stone, supra note 8, at 1151 ("Treatise-writing is discouraged, too, by the fact that
much of the most challenging, creative, and rewarding work that the enterprise once entailed-the supplying of insight and system-has largely been done in the major commonlaw fields."); Simpson, supra note 5, at 674 ("The great enterprise in which the treatise or
institutional writer is engaged is the methodizing of disorderly traditional or customary
law; once the job has been done competently by a Blackstone or a Story, much of its
intellectual excitement disappears.").
15. Simpson, supra note 5, at 674-75.
16. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (explaining
that the SEC brought an enforcement action against Texas Gulf Sulphur, alleging that the
company's press release downplaying the results of its drilling was fraudulently pessimistic
and that company insiders had committed securities fraud by trading the company's securities before the drilling results were reported to the public), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,401
F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968).
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dence was in a dynamic state, worthy of treatment in a treatise. 17 In the
preface to the first edition, Professor Bromberg explained:
The filing of the Texas Gulf Sulphur case gave us all a jolt. I was
asked to talk about the TGS case to the Corporation, Banking and
Business Law Section of the State Bar of Texas. My resurvey of Rule
10b-5 for this purpose prompted me to plan an article, then convinced me that a book was more appropriate.' 8
At that time, Professor Bromberg foresaw the potential expansion of
securities fraud jurisprudence, describing it as "a classic of the commonlaw vine supported by the legislative trellis, but with a distinct growth of
its own."' 19 Eight years later, in similarly metaphorical language, the Supreme Court would describe securities fraud jurisprudence as "a'20judicial
oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."
Uniquely, in recognition of the potentially surprising implications of
Rule 10b-5's reach, Professor Bromberg expanded the target audience of
his treatise beyond the traditional audience of practitioners and judges to
business people themselves. As he explained in the preface to the first
edition, "Since the Rule may apply to any business deal involving securities, the businessman must know something of the subject, and I have
tried to write for him as well as his lawyer ... 21
III.

CREATION OF AN INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK AND
PROVISION OF GUIDANCE THEREIN

An influential treatise author, once identifying a dynamic area of the
law, attempts to bring order to the chaos by creating an interpretive
framework and providing guidance within that framework. As explained
by Professor Simpson, "The great enterprise in which the treatise or institutional writer is engaged is the methodizing of disorderly traditional or
customary law."' 22 Professor Bromberg, confronting the dynamic area of
securities fraud, rose to that challenge by classifying the types of transactions to which Rule 10b-5 potentially applies, by identifying the potential
elements of a private claim under Rule 10b-5, and by providing guidance
within this interpretative framework.
First, drawing on the jurisprudence to date, Professor Bromberg identified four classes of transactions to which Rule 10b-5 potentially applies:
(1) "Direct-Personal Dealing (Face-to-Face Transactions, Other than with
17.

ALAN

R.

BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE

1OB-5, at vii (1967)

("10b-5's rapid evolution is still under way ....
18. Id. (italics added).
19. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITlES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 1OB-5 § 12.1 (1967).
20. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
21. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5, at vii (1967).
22. Simpson, supra note 5, at 674; see also Danner, supra note 13, at 834 ("In the
twenty-first century, American lawyers could benefit most from authoritative works on
specialized subjects by knowledgeable scholars who are not only able to provide interpretive frameworks for tackling new questions but also conversant with the technologies that
lawyers employ for seeking and working with legal information.").
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Broker-Dealers);" (2) "Direct-Personal Dealing (Broker-Dealers);" (3)
"Direct-Impersonal Dealing (Mergers, Tender Offers, etc.);" and (4) "Indirect-Impersonal Dealing (Stock Exchange and Open-market
Trades). 23 He explicitly recognized that this analytical framework differed from that of previous scholars, who had "surveyed the same authorities in terms of persons subject to the Rule or in terms of legal
concepts." '2 4 He explained that he chose to use this analytical framework
because "the areas have developed in quite different degrees to date, and
the evolution of one sheds light on the probabilities for another. 2' 5 Professor Bromberg's framework has proven lasting; indeed, the most recent
edition of the treatise continues to rely upon these initial classifications.2 6
Second, Professor Bromberg, drawing from common-law fraud concepts and the Rule lob-5 case law to date,2 7 identified the following
framework for analyzing private claims under Rule lOb-5: (1) misrepresentation or nondisclosure; fact versus opinion; (2) materiality; (3) scienter; negligence; (4) privity; (5) reliance; (6) causation of damages; and (7)
closed transaction; buyer or seller requirement.2 8 This articulation bears
remarkable similarity to the now-accepted elements of a private claim for
securities fraud: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance;
29
(5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.
Within that interpretive framework, Professor Bromberg provided remarkably prescient guidance about the application of Rule 10b-5. For example, five years before the Supreme Court held in Affiliated Ute Citizens
of Utah v. United States that in cases "involving primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery, ' 30 Professor Bromberg noted that "[i] n nondisclosure cases, reliance has little if
any rational role. '3 1 Indeed, the Affiliate Ute Court cited the 1967 edition
of Professor Bromberg's treatise in support of its holding. 32 Likewise,
before the Supreme Court weighed in, Professor Bromberg opined:
"Some sort of reasonable-man, objective test of investment judgment, intrinsic value, or (in the case of a publicly traded security) significant market effect is appropriate. 33 His recommendation came nine years before
TSC Industries,Inc. v. Northway, Inc., in which the Supreme Court stated
that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
23.

ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 §§ 4-7 (1967).
24. Id. § 3.1.

25. Id.

26.

§§ 4-6
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

ALAN R. BROMBERG ET AL., BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
(2d ed. 2014).
Id. § 8.1.
Id. § 8.
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972)
ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 1OB-5 § 8.6 (1967).

32. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54 (citing
FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 §§ 2.6 & 8.6 (1967)).
33.

ALAN

R.

ALAN

R.

BROMBERO, SECURITIES LAw:

BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAw: FRAUD-SEC RULE

1OB-5 § 8.3 (1967).
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vote" for purposes of Rule 14a-9, 34 and twenty-one years before the Su35
preme Court adopted the TSC Industries test for Rule lOb-5 actions.
Within the category of open-market trades, Professor Bromberg mused
about the possibility that "the market action of the stock" could operate
to communicate misrepresentations to investors, 36 twenty-one years
before the Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market presumption
of reliance in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 37 As another example, four years
before the Supreme Court's first expansive interpretation of the "in connection with" requirement, 3a he predicted that "[p]ossibly the courts will
conclude that any release of financial information by a publicly traded
company has the necessary connection. '39 Further, in 1968, Professor
Bromberg noted that expanding the class of potential plaintiffs beyond
buyers or sellers "looks suspiciously speculative. ' 40 Seven years later, the
Supreme Court agreed, limiting the class of potential plaintiffs to actual
purchasers and sellers in order to avoid the "largely conjectural and speculative recovery in which the number of shares involved will depend on
the plaintiff's subjective hypothesis."' 41 As a final example, twenty-one
years before the Supreme Court rejected a bright-line test for assessing
the materiality of information about corporate transactions, 4 2 Professor
Bromberg advocated for a fact-specific assessment of the materiality in
this context, including "how easily the corporate transaction can be consummated," "how early its values become fairly ascertainable," whether
the company to be acquired "is very small in relative assets or earnings,"
and whether "it is just one more acquisition'43by a company which is engaged in a continuous acquisition program.
IV. INFLUENCE AT PIVOTAL MOMENTS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE
Once a treatise writer has identified a dynamic area of the law, created
an interpretive framework, and provided guidance within that frame34. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
35. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
36. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 7.2(1) (1967).
37. Basic, 485 U.S. at 247 ("Because most publicly available information is reflected in
market price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore,
may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.").
38. Superintendent of Ins. of State of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6,
12-13 (1971) ("The crux of the present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result
of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."); see also Chadbourne
& Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1066 (2014) (holding that a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a security if it is "material
to a decision by one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or to sell" the
security).
39. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 7.2(2) (1967).
40. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 8.8 (1968).
41. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975).
42. Basic, 485 U.S. at 240 (endorsing a "fact-specific inquiry" into the materiality of
merger discussions).
43. ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE 10B-5 § 7.4(4)(b)

(1967).
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work, he or she is poised to influence the development of the doctrine at
pivotal moments. 44 Indeed, Professor Bromberg and his co-authors' treatise exerted this influence at multiple moments in the development of
45
such as in the creation of the widely-apsecurities fraud jurisprudence,
' 46
factors.
plied "Cammer
In March 1988, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court adopted
the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance, which enables plaintiffs
to establish the commonality and predominance prerequisites of class certification. 47 In short, in order to invoke the presumption, a plaintiff must
show "(1) that the alleged misrepresentation were publicly known, (2)
that they were material, (3) that the stock traded in an efficient market,
and (4) that the plaintiff traded the stock between the time the misrepresentations were made and when the truth was revealed. 4 8 The Court in
Basic provided little guidance to lower courts, however, about how to
define an efficient market and how to determine whether a market is
efficient.
In August 1988, Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels updated their
treatise to provide guidance on these issues. First, they defined an "effi' 4 9
cient market" as "one which rapidly reflects new information in price,
and they clarified that such a market will almost invariably be both open
and developed. 50 Second, they opined that, for fraud-on-the-market purposes, "each security has a distinct market;15 1 thus, the applicability of
the fraud-on-the-market presumption must be analyzed on a security-bysecurity basis. Third, they provided guidance on factors that courts should
consider when analyzing the efficiency of a market for a particular security, including "average weekly trading" volume,5 2 the "number of market
of float,' '5 4 and the "degree of responsiveness" to new
makers," 53 "size
55
information.
44. Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 890 (explaining that treatises "that deeply analyze
doctrine in specific areas can be useful to judges deciding cases that present novel and
difficult issues"); Edwards, supra note 9, at 44 (discussing how treatises can use theoretical
arguments to help judges decide the "hard" or "very hard" issues).
45. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 29-42.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 48-59.
47. Basic, 485 U.S. at 245-47; see FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) & 23(b)(3).
48. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014).
49. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1276 n.17 (D.N.J. 1989) (quoting BROMBERG & LOWENFELS,

4

SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD

§ 8.6 (1988)).

(quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURITIES FRAUD
AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6 (1988)).
51. Id. at 1281 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURITIES

50. Id.

FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD §

8.6 (1988)).

BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURI§ 8.6 (1988)).
53. Id. at 1283 n.30 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURITIES FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6 (1988)).
54. Id. (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERO & LEwIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURITIES FRAUD
AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6 (1988)).
55. Id. at 1292 (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 4 SECURITIES
FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6 (1988)).

52. Id. at 1292-93 (quoting
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In April 1989, Judge Alfred James Lechner, Jr., in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey, issued Cammer v. Bloom,
one of the first opinions to complete an in-depth analysis of Basic's application, and he cited Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels' treatise nine
times, quoting from it extensively.5 6 First, he adopted their definition of
market efficiency.5 7 Second, he agreed with them that market efficiency
must be determined on an individualized basis.5 8 Third, he identified a
series of factors (the so-called Cammer factors) that courts should consider when analyzing whether the market for a particular security was
efficient: (1) whether "there existed an average weekly trading volume
during the class period in excess of a certain number of shares;" (2)
whether "a significant number of securities analysts followed and reported on a company's stock during the class period;" (3) whether "it
could be alleged the stock had numerous market makers;" (4) whether
"the Company was entitled to file an S-3 Registration" and, if not,
whether "ineligibility was only because of timing factors rather than because the minimum stock requirements [i.e., public float requirements] . . .were not met;" and (5) whether "empirical facts show[] a
cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price. '59 Judge
Lechner relied on Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels' guidance in
60
crafting four of these five factors.
Cammer has been an extraordinarily influential. To date, 200 courts
have cited the opinion, 61 and eight circuits have (1) cited the Cammer
factors with approval, 62 (2) identified the factors as useful, 63 or (3) affirmed the district court's application of the factors without adopting
them.64 By extension, Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels' guidance
on how to apply Basic, on which the Cammer court relied heavily, likewise exerted tremendous influence in this area. In light of the Supreme
Court's recent reaffirmation of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
56. Id. at 1276 n.17, 1281, 1283 n.30, 1286, 1286 n.35, 1292, 1293.
57. Id. at 1286 n.35.
58. Id. at 1281.
59. Id. at 1286-87.
60. Id. at 1286-87, 1292-93 (not citing Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels in support of the analyst coverage factor).
61. Shepard's search performed in Lexis Advanced Research database on May 29,
2015.
62. Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie, 194 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th
Cir. 1999); Freeman v. Laventhol & Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1990).
63. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F. 3d 623, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that the Cammer factors "may be instructive depending on the circumstances"); In re Xcelera.com Sec.
Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 511 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the Cammer factors as "useful evidence
from which market efficiency may be inferred" but "not exhaustive").
64. Local 703, I. B. of T. Grocery & Food Empls.' Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin'l
Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2014) (declining to adopt the Cammer factors but
"not suggest[ing] that a [d]istrict [c]ourt would be wrong to rely on the Cammer factors to
guide its analysis"); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc.,
546 F.3d 196, 210 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that "the district court properly used the
Cammer factors as an 'analytical tool"' under the facts of the case).
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reliance, this influence will undoubtedly continue. 65
V.

SPRINGBOARD FOR OTHER TYPES OF
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Finally, a treatise's comprehensive and in-depth treatment of a dynamic area of the law can highlight discrepancies in the jurisprudence and
serve as a springboard for other types of legal scholarship, which can then
inform the treatise itself in an iterative relationship. Indeed, Professor
Bromberg and his co-authors have repeatedly drawn on their treatise to
make other scholarly contributions, which they have in turn incorporated
into their treatise. As one example, Professor Bromberg and his co-authors have published significant scholarly commentary about the evolution of aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5, both in their
treatise and in journal articles.
In 1988, Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels expanded on their
treatise's discussion of aiding and abetting liability with a comprehensive
law review article, titled "Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud: A Critical Examination," which was published in the Albany Law Review. 66 Despite widespread acceptance by courts of private claims for aiding and
abetting securities fraud, 67 they analyzed the validity of aiding and abet68
ting liability as an implied private action under the Cort v. Ash criteria,
concluding that "in general, they weigh against the aiding-abetting cause
of action."'69 In addition, they "attempt[ed] to untangle the elements of
an aiding-abetting violation," identified other factors that have influenced
courts when considering whether to impose liability, addressed the
"breadth of liability under the theory," and surveyed the usage of the
theory in private and enforcement actions. 70 Finally, they recognized that
the "the uncertainty and unpredictability of the law raises difficult
problems for the accountant, lawyer, lender or other person peripherally
involved in a transaction and trying to protect against liability" 71 and
called upon either the Supreme Court or Congress to address the existence and scope of a private claim for aiding and abetting securities
72
fraud.
In 1994, the Supreme Court answered that call in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, holding that there is not a private
cause of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud under § 10(b) and
65. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014).
66. Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud:A
Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637 (1988) [hereinafter Bromberg, Aiding].
67. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 192 (1994)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5.").
68. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
69. Bromberg, Aiding, supra note 66, at 650.
70. Id. at 643.
71. Id. at 772.
72. Id. at 773.
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Rule lOb-5. 73 The Court distinguished between questions about the scope
of conduct prohibited by § 10(b), which are controlled by the text of the
statute, and questions about the elements of a private claim for conduct
within the scope of § 10(b), which are inferred from how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the question if a private right of action had
been expressly included in Rule lOb-5. 74 After characterizing the question of private aiding and abetting liability as one of the former type, the
Court reached "the uncontroversial conclusion" that "the statute itself
resolves the case."'7 5 Additionally, the Court determined that this interpretation of the statute was not "'so bizarre' that Congress could not
have intended it," echoing Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels's discussion about the potential negative ripple effects of private aiding and
abetting liability on those peripherally involved in a transaction. 76
In response, a few months later, Professor Bromberg authored another
law review article, titled "Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection" and published in The Review of Securities & Commodities Regulation,77 which analyzed the Supreme Court's reasoning in
CentralBank and discussed the implications of the decision. Although the
Court reached the same conclusion that he and Mr. Lowenfels had forecast in their 1988 article, Professor Bromberg criticized the Court's
analysis:
The Central Bank majority did away with a cause of action that was
capable of abuse and that led to many settlements probably unjustified by the fact. But it did so in a flawed opinion based on a simplistic and overly literal rationale if it's not explicit in the statute, it
doesn't exist. The reverence for the letter of the statute was coupled
with indifference to legislative history, disdain for lower court precedent, and highly selective use of the Court's own precedents with
little or no effort to distinguish its cases that point the other way. The
policy discussion was a one-sided add-on, and the opinion failed to
consider such broader issues such as whether alternative sources of
liability are desirable in situations where the principal violators are
judgment-proof; whether private actions of this kind are still an important supplement to government enforcement of the securities
laws; and whether aid-abet liability is a useful incentive
to professional competence and [/] or deterrent to misconduct. 78
Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels included a similar critique of
Central Bank in their treatise, criticizing the Court's "literal no-word, no73. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
74. Id. at 172-73.
75. Id. at 177-78.
76. Id. at 188-90 ("[N]ewer and smaller companies may find it difficult to obtain advice from professionals.... In addition, the increased costs incurred by professionals because of the litigation and settlement costs under 10b-5 may be passed on to their client
companies, and in turn incurred by the company's investors, the intended beneficiaries of
the statute.").
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77. Alan R. Bromberg, Aiding and Abetting: Sudden Death and Possible Resurrection,
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 133 (1994).
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case ruling" and identifying flaws in the Court's reasoning. 79
In 1995, Congress responded to the ambiguity created by CentralBank
about whether the SEC could pursue enforcement actions against aiders
and abettors of securities fraud by explicitly authorizing such actions. The
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA") amended
§ 20 of the Exchange Act, authorizing the SEC to pursue money penalties
in civil actions against "any person that knowingly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this title, or any
rule or regulation issued under this title." 80
In response, in 1996, Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels again
published an article, titled A New Standard for Aiders and Abettors
Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and published
in The Business Lawyer.8 ' They analyzed the impact of the PSLRA's explicit aiding and abetting provision on the elements of an aiding-abetting
violation, which they had previously analyzed in their 1988 article. 82 They
predicted that the provision (1) "will require the second element of aiding
and abetting to scale upward to a 'knowing' or full scienter requirement
eliminating the constructive knowledge in the form of recklessness and
'should have known,' which had previously sufficed in some cases" and
(2) "will require the third element of aiding and abetting to scale upward
to require the SEC to prove that the actions and/or inactions of the alleged aider and abettor were a substantial proximate causal factor of the
primary violation and loss. ' ' 83 They also incorporated these predictions
into the 1997 update to their treatise. 8 4
In 2002, in the wake of various corporate scandals, Congress enacted
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 85 Although Sarbanes-Oxley did not modify the
aiding and abetting standard for § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations by attorneys, it codified the role of attorneys as "gatekeepers" by directing the
SEC to issue rules that (1) require "an attorney to report evidence of a
material violation of securities law or breach of fiduciary duty or similar
violation by the company or any agent thereof, to the chief legal counsel
or the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent thereof),"
and (2) require the attorney, "if the counsel or officer does not appropriately respond to the evidence," to "report the evidence to the audit committee of the board of directors of the issuer or to another committee of
the board of directors comprised solely of directors not employed directly
79. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS,
SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.5(608)

3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON
(2d ed. 1997).
80. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 104, 109
Stat. 737 (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)).
81. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, A New Standardfor Aiders and Abettors Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 52 Bus. LAW. 1 (1996)

[hereinafter Lowenfels, A New Standard].
82. Bromberg, Aiding, supra note 66, at 668-739.
83. Lowenfels, A New Standard,supra note 81, at 11-12.
84. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON

SECURITIES FRAUD § 8.5(612) (2d ed. 1997).
85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
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or indirectly by the issuer, or to the board of directors. 8' 6
In response, in 2006, Professor Bromberg, Mr. Lowenfels, and Mr. Sullivan co-authored another article, titled Attorneys As Gatekeepers: SEC
Actions Against Lawyers in the Age of Sarbanes-Oxley and published in
the University of Toledo Law Review.8 7 They argued that, "during the
post-Sarbanes-Oxley era, the SEC has initiated actions against lawyers
for activities which would never have been sanctioned pre-SarbanesOxley."8 8 As one example, they cited SEC enforcement actions against
attorneys for "relatively minor participation in filing an allegedly misleading Form 12b-25. ' '8 9 In addition, they incorporated into their treatise a
discussion of the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on the aggressiveness of SEC
enforcement against attorneys. 9 0
Finally, in 2010, in response to the upward scaling effect of § 20's
"knowingly" language, which Professor Bromberg and Mr. Lowenfels
had identified in their 1996 article, Congress again amended the statute.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 expressly extended the SEC's enforcement authority to aiders and
abettors who act "recklessly." 9 1
In sum, as exemplified through their extensive scholarly contributions
on aiding and abetting liability under Rule 10b-5, Professor Bromberg
and his co-authors' treatise has served both as a springboard for other
scholarly work and as a beneficiary of their insights developed in other
scholarly fora.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In closing, this essay argues that Professor Bromberg and his co-authors' treatise on securities fraud exemplifies the important role that treatises can still play within legal scholarship and, drawing therefrom,
identifies key attributes of impactful treatises to guide other scholars who
wish to emulate their contributions. On a personal note, as a graduate of
SMU Dedman School of Law who respected Professor Bromberg as a
faculty member, and as a junior scholar who seeks to build an impactful
body of scholarship, .Iam inspired by Professor Bromberg's lasting scholarly contributions to the understanding and evolution of the dynamic
area of securities fraud.
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89. Id. at 929.
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